["If Japan had chosen **not to fight the United States** and instead given up its continental interests (Manchuria, parts of China) within a “reasonable range,” several outcomes are likely:
* Japan would have avoided isolation, maintained trade with the U.S. and Europe, and preserved its industrial base.
* The military’s influence would have been curbed earlier, preventing the all-out mobilization that devastated the home front.
* In the Cold War, Japan could have emerged as an American partner without the stigma of being a defeated nation.
* China’s trajectory (civil war outcome, Communist victory) might have been different, reshaping the entire Asian balance of power.
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## 2. Key Turning Points
Several “decision nodes” could have changed history:
1. **1931 – Manchurian Incident**: Prevent the Kwantung Army’s engineered takeover.
2. **1937 – Marco Polo Bridge Incident (Lugouqiao)**: Stop escalation after a skirmish.
3. **1941 – Pearl Harbor decision**: Avoid attacking the U.S., continue negotiations.
The **most effective** turning point: 1931 (no Manchurian Incident).
The **last realistic** turning point: 1937 (prevent escalation into full Sino-Japanese War).
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## 3. Marco Polo Bridge Incident
* **If accidental**: Better communication protocols, joint investigation of missing soldiers, and strict rules of engagement could have kept it local.
* **If deliberate**: Local rules wouldn’t matter; Tokyo’s leadership (Konoe, Army HQ, Emperor) would need to enforce “non-expansion” strictly.
Thus, the crucial factor was not only the skirmish itself but Tokyo’s decision to **either extinguish or exploit the fire**.
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## 4. The Konoe Cabinet (1937–1939)
* **Prime Minister**: Fumimaro Konoe, aristocrat, popular figure but politically inexperienced.
* **Features**:
* Non-party cabinet, relying on bureaucrats, nobles, and the military.
* Dependent on the Army and unable to restrain its actions.
* Responsive to public opinion, which was strongly pro-war.
* **Fatal decisions**:
* Declared “We will not deal with the Nationalist Government” (Jan 1938), closing peace talks.
* Proclaimed the “New Order in East Asia” (Nov 1938), a slogan justifying further expansion.
* Promoted the “New Political Order” (1940), leading to the dissolution of parties and the creation of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association.
Result: **High ideals in rhetoric, but in reality, the cabinet legitimized military expansion and deepened the war.**
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## 5. The New Order in East Asia (東亜新秩序)
* **Political**: Japan, China, Manchukuo cooperate, especially against communism.
* **Economic**: A self-sufficient bloc economy centered on Japan.
* **Cultural**: Promote “Eastern moral values” in contrast to Western imperialism.
In practice:
* Functioned as a justification for Japanese hegemony.
* Rejected by the Chinese, condemned by Western powers.
* Deepened Japan’s isolation and paved the road to conflict with the U.S.
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## 6. Why No Course Correction?
* **Structural weakness**: Civilian cabinets lacked authority over the military due to the “independent command” system.
* **Military dominance**: Field armies created faits accomplis, which Tokyo merely ratified.
* **Public opinion & media**: Inflamed nationalism pressured leaders to escalate.
* **International context**: The League of Nations was ineffective, and the U.S. was isolationist.
* **Konoe’s character**: Popular and idealistic, but indecisive and reluctant to confront the Army or the public mood.
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## Conclusion
The Konoe Cabinet became a decisive **turning point**:
* It could have contained the Marco Polo Bridge Incident and sought peace with China.
* Instead, it closed the door to negotiations, embraced expansionist slogans, and drifted toward total war.
* While responsibility is shared among the military, the Emperor, public opinion, and international factors, **Konoe’s failure to enforce a “non-expansion policy” made the Pacific War far more likely.**
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「失敗の本質」より
「日本軍は、情報機関の欠陥と過度の精神主義により、敵を知らず、己を知らず、大敵を侮っていた。」
ジューコフ将軍
「日本軍の下士官兵は頑強で勇敢であり、青年将校は狂信的な頑強さで闘うが、高級将校は無能である。」